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Inequality Effects of a Carbon Tax, Individual Inequality Aversion, and Limitations of Renewables Subsidies

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Contents

1	Introduction	1
2	Effects of a Carbon Tax on Income Inequality Between Skill Groups	9
2.1	Introduction	9
2.2	Literature	14
2.3	Theoretical Model	20
2.3.1	Production and Technology	21
2.3.2	Consumers	24
2.3.3	The Government	25
2.3.4	Equilibrium Conditions	26
2.3.5	The Factor Channel and the Commodity Channel	28
2.4	Data	30
2.4.1	Aggregation of Industries	30
2.4.2	Parameter and Calibration Values	34

2.4.3	The Netherlands as Energy Transition Country	36
2.4.4	Labour and Capital	36
2.4.5	Calibration	37
2.5	Simulations	40
2.5.1	Baseline Results	40
2.5.2	Revenue Recycling	43
2.5.3	Current Account	44
2.5.4	Sensitivity Analysis	46
2.6	Conclusion	51
2.7	Appendix: Current Account and the Role of the Government	54
3	Individual Inequality Aversion	67
3.1	Introduction	67
3.2	Model	75
3.2.1	Optimal Income Taxation: No Environment	75
3.2.2	Households	76
3.2.3	The Government	78
3.2.4	Inequality	78
3.3	Optimal Income Taxation, no Environment	79

3.4	Optimal Taxation: the Environment	84
3.4.1	Corrective Taxes	86
3.4.2	Numerical example	89
3.5	Conclusion	96
3.6	Appendix	98
3.6.1	Keeping up With the Joneses	98
3.6.2	Simulation	99
3.6.3	Case Study: CD-utility, Optimal Linear Taxation	99
3.6.4	Numerical example	100
3.6.5	Results	101
4	Subsidizing Renewables in the Presence of a Dirty Backstop	103
4.1	Introduction	103
4.2	Model	107
4.3	Social Optimum	109
4.3.1	Solving the Social Optimum Problem	109
4.3.2	Solving the Laissez-Faire Equilibrium	113
4.3.3	Calibration	114
4.3.4	Policy Simulations	115

4.4	The optimal subsidy	117
4.4.1	Optimal Subsidy Level and Timing	117
4.4.2	Potential Announcement Effects	119
4.4.3	Policy Simulations	120
4.4.4	Announcement Effects	121
4.4.5	Varying Damage Intensity and Cost of Renewables	122
4.5	Conclusion	124
4.6	Appendix	127
4.6.1	Description of Different Regimes	127
4.6.2	Numerical Methods	128
4.6.3	Proof of no Simultaneous Use in the Market and Second Best	132
4.6.4	Commitment Effects	133
4.6.5	Proof of no Green Paradox if Renewables are After Coal	134
5	Conclusion	141
6	Acknowledgements	145
7	Nederlandse samenvatting	147
	Bibliography	149